G. C. Lim and Paul D. McNelis

Inflation Targeting, Learning and Q Volatility in Small Open Economies

G. C. Lim* and Paul D. McNelis[#]

* **Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research,
The University of Melbourne**
[#] **Fordham University**

Abstract

This paper examines the welfare implications of managing asset-price with consumer-price inflation targeting by monetary authorities who have to learn the laws of motion for both inflation rates. The central bank can reduce the volatility of consumption as well as improve welfare more effectively if it adopts state-contingent Taylor rules aimed at inflation and Q-growth targets in this learning environment. However, under perfect model certainty, pure inflation targeting dominates combined consumer and asset-price inflation targeting.

1 Introduction

Many countries now practice inflation targeting, but that has not immunized economies from experiencing asset price volatility (for example, in the form of exchange rate instability in Australia or share-market bubbles in the United States). The practice of controlling changes in goods prices is taken for granted by many Central Banks, but there is no consensus about the management of asset-price inflation, except in the sense that it is not desirable for asset prices to be too high or too volatile. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2003, Lawrence Summers suggested that policy makers should use other tools, such as margin lending requirements or public jawboning, to combat asset-price inflation. He compared raising interest rates to combat asset-price inflation to a preemptive attack, and stated "it takes enormous hubris to know when the right moment has come to start a war" [Summers (2003), p.1].

Recent research shows that central bankers should not target asset prices [see. for example. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for a closed economy study]. However, Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2002) have argued that central banks should "react to asset price misalignments". In essence, they show that when disturbances are nominal, reacting to close misalignment gaps significantly improves macroeconomic performance. Smets (1997) has also stressed that the proper response of monetary policy to asset-price inflation depends on the source of the asset-price movements. If productivity changes are the driving force, accommodation is called for, and real interest rates should remain unchanged. However, if the source is due to non-fundamental shocks in the equity market, in the form of bullish predictions about productivity, then monetary policy should raise interest rates.

In contrast to previous studies we evaluate monetary policy in a small open-economy framework, and in particular we are concerned with investment in a resource-rich small open economy subjected to the vagaries of international terms of trade shocks. Detken and Smets (2004) have shown that high cost asset-price booms are as common in small open economies

subject to fundamental terms-of-trade shocks as they are in relatively closed economies driven by fundamental productivity shocks.

We also highlight learning on the part of the Central Bank. For a small open economy subject to terms of trade movements, learning behavior on the part of the policy authority is an appropriate assumption, since movements of the terms of trade are determined in international markets far removed from the influence of domestic policy actions. In this context, central banks are more likely to be engaged in learning behavior.[1]

The economy we study has an export sector and an imported manufactured goods sector. The terms of trade are driven by movements in the commodity export price relative to the price of manufactured goods. The volatility of this relative price in turn affects share prices and investment in the booming (or declining) export sector.

In this paper, we consider the rate of growth of Tobin's Q, first introduced by Tobin (1969), as a potential target variable for monetary policy. Our reasoning is that Q-growth would be small when the growth in the market valuation of capital assets corresponds roughly with the growth of replacement costs. Since asset prices (in the market value) are a lot less sticky than good prices (in the replacement cost), the presence of high Q-growth would be indicative of misalignment of market value and replacement cost, in other words an indication of an "excessive" change in the share price. Thus monitoring and targeting Q-growth may be viewed as a proxy policy for monitoring and targeting asset price inflation, but with the advantage that the asset price is evaluated relative to a benchmark (the replacement cost).

The focus on Q is also influenced by Brainard and Tobin (1977), who argued that Q plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy both directly via the capital investment decision of enterprises and indirectly via consumption decisions. Thus volatility of Q has implications for inflation

---

[1]See Bullard and Mitra (2002) for a study with private sector learning and see Evans and Honkapohja (2003) for a study with central bank learning where the learning relates to obtaining structural parameters needed in the policy rule. See also Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) for a study where the central bank generates forecasts but that paper did not explore the issue of asset-price targeting in an open economy.

and growth. Large swings in Q can lead to systematic over-investment, and in the open-economy context, over-borrowing and serious capital account deficits.

This paper is concerned with the thought experiment: what happens to consumption, inflation and welfare if the central bank also monitors Q? In particular, we will generate the welfare implications of adopting a stance of monetary policy which includes targeting consumer price inflation as well as changes in Q. We assume that the policy makers have to learn about the nature of the shock as well as the underlying laws of motion of Q-growth and price inflation, subject to uncertainty about the underlying model.

We first examine the performance of Taylor rules in a no-learning context when the central bank knows the underlying true model. Two types of Taylor rules are examined - optimal Taylor rules and rules with pre-set Taylor coefficients. We show that, in a no learning environment, there is no case for including asset-price inflation as a target for monetary policy - the welfare differences are minor. In this case, since the underlying true inflation process depends, in part, on asset-price inflation, there is no need to target asset-price inflation as well as goods-price inflation.

We then present the implications for two monetary policy scenarios with learning behavior. First, we consider standard Taylor rules for inflation targeting with and without reacting to Q-growth and then we examine state-contingent Taylor rules where monetary policy is more cautious. In this case, policy makers react to price inflation or Q-growth only when their forecasts cross critical thresholds; otherwise they refrain from taking action by raising or lowering interest rates, except in a worst-case scenario. This approach is similar to a "worst-case" robust control approach to monetary policy design, put forward by Rustem, Wieland, and Žaković (2005). They show that under uncertainty this approach leads to more moderate policy responses and represents a form of "cautionary monetary policy" advocated by Brainard (1967), who argued that the degree of policy activism should vary inversely with the extent of uncertainty about policy effectiveness [Rustem, Wieland, and Žaković (2005): p. 15].[2] To anticipate the result, we show in this paper

---

[2]The policy framework is also in line with Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005) who advo-

that learning is the key assumption for justifying asset-price inflation targeting but that the presence of forecast errors implies that the Q-growth target should only be incorporated in a state-contingent Taylor rule.

The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2, and the solution algorithm is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the simulation results for the alternative policy frameworks with and without learning. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.

2 Model Specification

The framework of analysis contains two modules - a module which describes the behavior of the private sector and a module which describes the behavior of the central bank.

2.1 Private Sector Behavior

The private sector is assumed to follow the standard optimizing behavior characterized in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.

2.1.1 Consumption

The utility function for the private sector "representative agent" is given by the following function:

$$U(C_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \tag{1}$$

where C is the aggregate consumption index and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Unless otherwise specified, upper case variables denote the levels of the variables while lower case letters denote logarithms of the same variables. The exception is the nominal interest rate denoted as i.

The representative agent as "household/firm" optimizes the following in-

---

cated a robust approach when information about the nature of the bubble is unavailable to the policy authority.

tertemporal welfare function, with an endogenous discount factor:

$$W_t = \mathbf{E}_t \left[\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \vartheta_{t+i} U(C_{t+i}) \right] \tag{2}$$

$$\vartheta_{t+1+i} = [1 + \overline{C}_t]^{-\beta} \cdot \vartheta_{t+i}; \qquad \vartheta_t = 1 \tag{3}$$

where $\mathbf{E}_t$ is the expectations operator, conditional on information available at time t, while β approximates the elasticity of the endogenous discount factor ϑ with respect to the average consumption index, $\overline{C}$. Endogenous discounting is due to Uzawa (1968) and is needed for the model to produce well-behaved dynamics with deterministic stationary equilibria.[3]

The specification used in this paper is due to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). In our model, an individual agent's discount factor does not depend on their own consumption; rather their discount factor depends on the average level of consumption. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) argue that this simplification reduces the equilibrium conditions by one Euler equation and one state variable over the standard model with endogenous discounting; it greatly facilitates the computation of the equilibrium dynamics, while delivering "virtually identical" predictions of key macroeconomic variables as the standard endogenous-discounting model.[4]

The consumption index is a composite index of non-tradeable goods n and tradeable goods f :

$$C_t = \left(C_t^f \right)^{\alpha_f} (C_t^n)^{1-\alpha_f} \tag{4}$$

where α_f is the proportion of traded goods. Given the aggregate consumption expenditure constraint,

$$P_t C_t = P_t^f C_t^f + P_t^n C_t^n \tag{5}$$

---

[3]Endogenous discounting also allows the model to support equilibria in which credit frictions may remain binding.

[4]Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) argue that if the reason for introducing endogenous discounting is solely for introducing stationarity, "computational convenience" should be the decisive factor for modifying the standard Uzawa-type model.

and the definition of the real exchange rate,

$$Z_t = \frac{P_t^f}{P_t^n} \qquad (6)$$

the following expressions give the demand for traded and non-traded goods as functions of aggregate expenditure and the real exchange rate Z:

$$C_t^f = \left(\frac{1-\alpha_f}{\alpha_f}\right)^{-1+\alpha_f} Z_t^{-1+\alpha_f} C_t \qquad (7)$$

$$C_t^n = \left(\frac{1-\alpha_f}{\alpha_f}\right)^{\alpha_f} Z_t^{\alpha_f} C_t \qquad (8)$$

Similarly, we can express the consumption of traded goods as a composite index of the consumption of export goods, C^x, and import goods C^m:

$$C_t^f = (C_t^x)_t^{\alpha_x} (C_t^m)^{1-\alpha_x} \qquad (9)$$

where α_x is the proportion of export goods. The aggregate expenditure constraint for tradeable goods is given by the following expression:

$$P_t^f C_t^f = P_t^m C_t^m + P_t^x C_t^x \qquad (10)$$

where P^x and P^m are the prices of export and import type goods respectively. Defining the terms of trade index J as:

$$J = \frac{P^x}{P^m} \qquad (11)$$

yields the demand for export and import goods as functions of the aggregate consumption of traded goods as well as the terms of trade index:

$$C_t^x = \left(\frac{1-\alpha_x}{\alpha_x}\right)^{-1+\alpha_x} J_t^{-1+\alpha_x} C_t^f \qquad (12)$$

$$C_t^m = \left(\frac{1-\alpha_x}{\alpha_x}\right)^{\alpha_x} J_t^{\alpha_x} C_t^f \qquad (13)$$

6

2.1.2 Production

Production of exports and imports is by the Cobb-Douglas technology:

$$Y_t^x = A_t^x (K_{t-1}^x)^{1-\theta_x} \qquad (14)$$

$$Y_t^m = A_t^m (K_{t-1}^m)^{1-\theta_m} \qquad (15)$$

where A^x, A^m represents the labour factor productivity terms[5] in the production of export and import goods, and $(1 - \theta_x)$, $(1 - \theta_m)$ are the coefficients of the capital K^x and K^m respectively. The time subscripts $(t-1)$ indicate that they are the beginning-of-period values. The production of non-traded goods, which is usually in services, is given by the labour productivity term, A_t^n :

$$Y_t^n = A_t^n \qquad (16)$$

Capital in each sector has the respective depreciation rates, δ_x and δ_m, and evolves according to the following identities:

$$K_t^x = (1 - \delta_x)K_{t-1}^x + I_t^x \qquad (17)$$

$$K_t^m = (1 - \delta_m)K_{t-1}^m + I_t^m \qquad (18)$$

where I_t^x and I_t^m represent investment in each sector.

2.1.3 Budget Constraint

The budget constraint faced by the household/firm representative agent is:

$$P_t C_t = \Pi_t + S_t \left[L_t^* - L_{t-1}^*(1 + i_{t-1}^*) \right] - [B_t - B_{t-1}(1 + i_{t-1})] - Tax_t \qquad (19)$$

where S is the exchange rate (defined as domestic currency per foreign), L_t^* is foreign debt in foreign currency, and B_t is domestic debt in domestic currency and Tax_t is a lump sum tax. The profit, Π, is defined by the

---

[5]Since the representative agent determines both consumption and production decisions, we have simplified the analysis by abstracting from issues about labour-leisure choice and wage determination.

following expression:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pi_t &= P_t^x \left[A_t^x \left(K_{t-1}^x \right)^{1-\theta_x} - \frac{\phi_x}{2K_{t-1}^x} \left(I_t^x \right)^2 - I_t^x \right] \\
&\quad + P_t^m \left[A_t^m (K_{t-1}^m)^{1-\theta_m} - \frac{\phi_m}{2K_{t-1}^m} \left(I_t^m \right)^2 - I_t^m \right] + P_t^n A_t^n \quad (20)
\end{aligned}
$$

The aggregate resource constraint shows that the firm faces quadratic adjustment costs when they accumulate capital, with these costs given by the terms $\frac{\phi_x}{2K_{t-1}^x} \left(I_t^x \right)^2$ and $\frac{\phi_m}{2K_{t-1}^m} \left(I_t^m \right)^2$.

The household/firm may lend to the domestic government and accumulate bonds B which pay the nominal interest rate i. They can also borrow internationally and accumulate international debt L^* at the fixed rate i^*, but this would also include a cost of currency exchange.[6]

The bond holdings and foreign debt holdings evolve as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
B_{t+1} &= B_t(1 + i_t) - Tax_t + P_t^n G_t &\quad (21) \\
S_t L_{t+1}^* &= S_t L_t^* (1 + i_t^*) + (P_t^m M_t - P_t^x X_t) &\quad (22)
\end{aligned}
$$

where G is government expenditure (exogenously determined).[7]

2.1.4 Euler Equations

The household/firm optimizes the expected value of the utility of consumption (2) subject to the budget constraint defined in (19) and (20) and the constraints in (17) and (18).

The variable Λ is the familiar Lagrangian multiplier representing the marginal utility of wealth. The terms Q^x and Q^m, known as Tobin's Q, represent the Lagrange multipliers for the evolution of capital in each sector - they are the "shadow prices" for new capital.

---

[6]The time-varying risk premium is assumed to be zero.

[7]In the simulations, G is set at zero. Thus the private sector holds government bonds and is taxed in a lump sum fashion to service the debt. The presence of a domestic debt instrument is a necessary device to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy operating on the domestic interest rate.

$$Max \quad : \quad \mathbf{L} = \mathbf{E}_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \vartheta_{t+i} \{ U(C_{t+i})$$

$$-\Lambda_{t+i} [C_{t+i} - \frac{P_{t+i}^x}{P_{t+i}} \left(A_{t+i}^x (K_{t-1+i}^x)^{1-\theta_x} - \frac{\phi_x}{2K_{t-1+i}^x} \left(I_{t+i}^x \right)^2 - I_{t+i}^x \right)$$

$$-\frac{P_{t+i}^m}{P_{t+i}} \left(A_{t+i}^m (K_{t-1+i}^m)^{1-\theta_m} - \frac{\phi_m}{2K_{t-1+i}^m} \left(I_{t+i}^m \right)^2 - I_{t+i}^m \right) - \frac{P_{t+i}^n}{P_{t+i}} A_{t+i}^n$$

$$-\frac{S_{t+i}}{P_{t+i}} \left(L_{t+i}^* - L_{t-1+i}^* (1 + i_{t+i}^*) \right) + \frac{1}{P_{t+i}} \left(B_{t+i} - B_{t-1+i}(1 + i_{t-1+i}) \right) + Tax_t]$$

$$-Q_{t+i}^x \left[K_{t+i}^x - I_{t+i}^x - (1 - \delta_x) K_{t-1+i}^x \right]$$
$$-Q_{t+i}^m \left[K_{t+i}^m - I_{t+i}^m - (1 - \delta_m) K_{t-1+i}^m \right] \}$$

Maximizing the Lagrangian with respect to $C_t, L_t^*, B_t, K_t^x, K_t^m, I_t^x, I_t^m$ yields the following first order conditions:

$$\Lambda_t \quad = \quad U'(C_t) \tag{23}$$

$$\vartheta_t U'(C_t)/P_t \quad = \quad \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} U'(C_{t+1})(1 + i_t)/P_{t+1} \tag{24}$$

$$\vartheta_t U'(C_t)S_t/P_t \quad = \quad \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} U'(C_{t+1})(1 + i_t^*)S_{t+1}/P_{t+1} \tag{25}$$

$$\left[\vartheta_t Q_t^x - \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} Q_{t+1}^x (1 - \delta_x) \right] \quad = \quad \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} \Lambda_{t+1} \frac{P_{t+1}^x}{P_{t+1}} \left[A_{t+1}^x (1 - \theta_x)(K_t^x)^{-\theta_x} + \frac{\phi_x \left(I_{t+1}^x \right)^2}{2 \left(K_t^x \right)^2} \right] \tag{26}$$

$$\left[\vartheta_t Q_t^m - \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} Q_{t+1}^m (1 - \delta_m) \right] \quad = \quad \mathbf{E}_t \vartheta_{t+1} \Lambda_{t+1} \frac{P_{t+1}^m}{P_{t+1}} \left[A_{t+1}^m (1 - \theta_m)(K_t^m)^{-\theta_m} + \frac{\phi_m \left(I_{t+1}^m \right)^2}{2 \left(K_t^m \right)^2} \right] \tag{27}$$

$$I_t^x \quad = \quad \frac{1}{\phi_x} \left(\frac{Q_t^x}{\Lambda_t} - 1 \right) K_{t-1}^x \tag{28}$$

$$I_t^m \quad = \quad \frac{1}{\phi_m} \left(\frac{Q_t^m}{\Lambda_t} - 1 \right) K_{t-1}^m \tag{29}$$

The above equations (26) and (27) show that the solutions for Q_t^x and Q_t^m, which determine investment and the evolution of capital in each sector, come from forward-looking stochastic Euler equations. The shadow price or replacement value of capital in each sector is equal to the discounted value of next period's marginal productivity, the adjustment costs due to the new capital stock, and the expected replacement value net of depreciation.

The interest parity condition implied in the model can be derived from combining equations (24) and (25):

$$\mathbf{E}_t \left[\vartheta_{t+1} U'(C_{t+1})(1 + i_t) S_t / P_{t+1} \right] = \mathbf{E}_t \left[\vartheta_{t+1} U'(C_{t+1})(1 + i_t^*) S_{t+1} / P_{t+1} \right]$$

The standard interest parity relationship can then be derived by log-linearization and by imposing the condition of statistical independence. Our non-linear solution algorithm acknowledges the joint distribution of the endogenous variables in the determination of the exchange rate.

We also note that the solution for each sector's Q also gives each sector's investment, I. Alternatively, if we know the optimal decision rule for investment for each sector, we can obtain the value Q for each sector:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q_t^x &= \Lambda_t \left(\frac{\phi_x I_t^x}{K_{t-1}^x} + 1 \right) \\
Q_t^m &= \Lambda_t \left(\frac{\phi_m I_t^m}{K_{t-1}^m} + 1 \right)
\end{aligned}
$$

In the steady state, of course, the investment/capital ratio is equal to the rate of depreciation for each sector. Thus, the steady state value of Q for each sector is given by the following expressions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\overline{Q}_t^x &= \overline{\Lambda} \left(\phi_x \delta^x + 1 \right) \\
\overline{Q}_t^m &= \overline{\Lambda} \left(\phi_m \delta^m + 1 \right)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\overline{\Lambda} = U'(\overline{C})$.

The solution of the model, discussed below, involves finding decision rules

for C_t, S_t, Q_t^x, and Q_t^m so that the Euler equation errors given in equations (**??**) through (29) are minimized. Given that we wish to impose non-negativity constraints on C_t, S_t, I_t^x, I_t^m, we specify decision rules for these variables and solve for the implied values of Q_t^x, Q_t^m.

2.1.5 Exchange rate pass-through and stickiness

The price of export goods is determined exogenously for a small open economy (P^{x*}) and its price in domestic currency is $P^x = SP^{x*}$. The price of import goods is also determined exogenously for a small open economy P^{m*}, but, we assume that price changes are incompletely passed-through (see Campa and Goldberg (2002) for a study on exchange rate pass-through and import prices). Using the definition: $P^m = SP^{m*}$ and assuming partial adjustment, we obtain:

$$p_t^m = \omega(s_t + p_t^{m*}) + (1 - \omega)p_{t-1}^m \tag{30}$$

where $\omega = 1$ indicates complete pass-through of foreign price changes.

For completeness, the index of foreign price P_t^f and the index of aggregate price P_t are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
P_t^f &= (1 - \alpha_x)^{\alpha_x - 1} (\alpha_x)^{-\alpha_x} (P_t^x)^{\alpha_x} (P_t^m)^{1 - \alpha_x} \tag{31} \\
P_t &= (1 - \alpha_f)^{\alpha_f - 1} (\alpha_f)^{-\alpha_f} \left(P_t^f\right)^{\alpha_f} (P_t^n)^{(1 - \alpha_f)} \tag{32}
\end{aligned}
$$

2.1.6 Macroeconomic Identities

The market clearing conditions are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(Y_t^x - \frac{\phi_x}{2K_t^x}(I_t^x)^2\right) &= (C_t^x + X_t + I_t^x) \\
\left(Y_t^m - \frac{\phi_m}{2K_t^m}(I_t^m)^2\right) &= (C_t^m - M_t + I_t^m) \tag{33} \\
Y_t^n &= C_t^n + G_t
\end{aligned}
$$

Real gross domestic product is given as:

$$y = \frac{1}{P_t} \left[P_t^x \left(Y_t^x - \frac{\phi_x}{2K_t^x}(I_t^x)^2 \right) + P_t^m \left(Y_t^m - \frac{\phi_m}{2K_t^m}(I_t^m)^2 \right) + P_t^n Y_t^n \right] \quad (34)$$

2.2   Terms of Trade

The only shocks explored in this paper comes from the terms of trade. Specifically:

$$p_t^{x*} = 0.9p_{t-1}^{x*} + 0.1\overline{p^{x*}} + \varepsilon_t^{x*}; \qquad \varepsilon_t^{x*} \sim N(0, 0.01)$$

where lower case denotes the log of the world export price, p_t^{x*} and $\overline{p^{x*}}$ is normalized to zero. The evolution of the price mimics actual data generating processes, with a normally distributed innovation with standard deviation set at 0.01. We assume that p_t^{m*} is constant, with normalization $\overline{p^{m*}} = 0$, so that the stochastic process describes a mean-reverting terms of trade process.

The simulations are also conducted assuming that the domestic price of export goods fully reflect the exogenously determined prices:

$$p_t^x = s_t + p_t^{x*} \quad (35)$$

however, the domestic price of import goods is partially passed on:

$$p_t^m = \omega(s_t + p_t^{m*}) + (1 - \omega)p_{t-1}^m \quad (36)$$

where ω is the coefficient of exchange rate pass-through and p_{t-1}^m is the starting value for import goods which is set to $\overline{p^{m*}}$. In this paper we shall only present results for the case of low pass-through $\omega = 0.3$ (see estimates cited in Campa and Goldberg (2002)). This is a simulation study about the design of monetary policy for an economy subjected to relative price shocks.

2.3   Monetary Authority

We are concerned with Taylor (1993, 1999) type rules, one with only annualized price inflation targeting (π), for the desired interest rate, $\overline{i_t}$, and one with inflation and Q-growth targeting (π, η). However, they are evaluated

under four scenarios - standard Taylor rules (denoted by the functions $N(\pi)$, $N(\pi, \eta)$) and optimal Taylor rules (denoted by the functions $O(\pi)$, $O(\pi, \eta)$) with no learning in both cases; and standard Taylor rules (denoted by $T(\widehat{\pi})$, $T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$),and state-contingent Taylor rules (denoted by $S(\widehat{\pi})$, $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$) with central bank learning in both cases. In the no-learning context, the rules are function of actual inflation and Q-growth, π, η, whereas in the learning context, they are functions of the Central Bank forecasts of inflation and Q-growth, $\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta}$.

2.3.1 Policies with No Central Bank Learning

- Standard Taylor Rules

For the pure inflation targeting regime, the desired interest rate has the following form:

$$\overline{i_t} = i^* + \phi_\pi(\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi}), \qquad \phi_\pi > 1 \tag{37}$$

with $\pi_t = ((P_t/P_{t-4}) - 1)$ representing an annualized rate of actual inflation, and π_t the actual inflation. The desired long run inflation rate is given by $\widetilde{\pi}$. The actual interest rate follows the following partial adjustment mechanism to allow for smoothing behavior:

$$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)\overline{i_t} \tag{38}$$

The no-learning Taylor rule $N(\pi)$ becomes:

$$N(\pi) : i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)\left[i^* + \phi_\pi(\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi})\right] \tag{39}$$

In the goods-price and asset-price inflation regime, we change the formulation for the desired interest rate to include the Q-growth, η_t and a desired target rate, $\widetilde{\eta}$:

$$\overline{i_t} = i^* + \phi_\pi(\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi}) + \phi_\eta(\eta_t - \widetilde{\eta}), \qquad \phi_\pi > 1, \phi_\eta > 0 \tag{40}$$

with $\eta_t = ((Q_t^x/Q_{t-4}^x) - 1)$ representing an annualized rate of Q-growth for exportable goods and $\widetilde{\eta}$ represents the target for this rate of growth. In this

case, the Taylor rule $N(\pi, \eta)$ with smoothing becomes:

$$N(\pi, \eta) : i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta) \left[i^* + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi}) + \phi_\eta (\eta_t - \widetilde{\eta}) \right] \qquad (41)$$

The Taylor coefficients are predetermined at $\theta = 0.9, \phi_\pi = 1.5$ and $\phi_\eta = 0.5$.

- Optimal Taylor Rules

As a check, on the robustness of the results, we also consider the case where the Taylor coefficients are optimally determined. The rules $O(\pi)$ and $O(\pi, \eta)$ in this case are:

$$O(\pi) \quad : \quad i_t = \widehat{\theta} i_{t-1} + (1 - \widehat{\theta}) \left[i^* + \widehat{\phi}_\pi (\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi}) \right] \qquad (42)$$

$$O(\pi, \eta) \quad : \quad i_t = \widehat{\theta} i_{t-1} + (1 - \widehat{\theta}) \left[i^* + \widehat{\phi}_\pi (\pi_t - \widetilde{\pi}) + \widehat{\phi}_\eta (\eta_t - \widetilde{\eta}) \right] \qquad (43)$$

where the $\widehat{}$ indicates that the coefficients are estimated. The estimated optimal coefficients are:

$$O(\pi) \quad : \quad \widehat{\theta} = 0.2336; \quad \widehat{\phi}_\pi = 1.9999$$

$$O(\pi) \quad : \quad \widehat{\theta} = 0.000; \quad \widehat{\phi}_\pi = 1.5935, \quad \widehat{\phi}_\eta = 0.5774$$

indicating that the main implication of the fixed coefficient cases is the imposition of the smoothing coefficient.

2.3.2   Policies with Central Bank Learning

We now assume, perhaps more realistically, that the monetary authority does not know the exact nature of the private sector model. Instead, it adopts a VAR forecasting model of lag order k for forecasting the evolution of the state variable, x_t. The model takes the general form:

$$x_t = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \Gamma_{1t,j} x_{t-j-1} + \Gamma_{2t} i_t + e_t$$

Under the inflation-only policy scenario, the monetary authority estimates or learns the evolution of inflation as a function of its own lag as well as the

interest rate. In this case $x_t = \widehat{\pi}_t$. We use six lags and $\Gamma_{1t,j}$ is a recursively updated matrix of coefficients, representing the effects of lagged inflation on current inflation.

- Linear Taylor Rules

The two standard Taylor rules, under a learning environment becomes:

$$T(\widehat{\pi}) \quad : \quad i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)\left[i^* + \phi_\pi(\widehat{\pi}_t - \widetilde{\pi})\right] \tag{44}$$

$$T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta}) \quad : \quad i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)\left[i^* + \phi_\pi(\widehat{\pi}_t - \widetilde{\pi}) + \phi_\eta(\widehat{\eta}_t - \widetilde{\eta})\right] \tag{45}$$

the main difference being that inflation and Q-growth are now forecasted.

- State-Contingent Taylor Rules

We also consider the case when the Taylor rule applied is dependent on the conditions at time t and reflects the Central Bank's concerns about inflation. Under the inflation-only targeting case, the rules $S(\widehat{\pi})$ are described in Table 1.

Table 1: Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting Only: $S(\widehat{\pi})$	
$|\widehat{\pi}_t| < 0.02$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)[i^*]$
$|\widehat{\pi}_t| \geqq 0.02$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)[i^* + \phi_\pi(\widehat{\pi}_t - \widetilde{\pi})]$

In this pure anti-inflation scenario, if the absolute value of inflation is below the target level π^* then the government only engages in smoothing behavior. However, if inflation is above or below the target rate, the monetary authority implements the Taylor rule.

In the inflation and Q-growth case, the state contingent Taylor policy rules $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$ are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Policy Rules for Inflation and Q-Growth Targeting: $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$		
	Q-Growth	
Inflation	$|\widehat{\eta}_t| < 0.02$	$|\widehat{\eta}_t| \geqq 0.02$
$|\widehat{\pi}_t| < 0.02$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1-\theta)[i^*]$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1-\theta)\left[i^* + \phi_\eta(\widehat{\eta}_t - \widetilde{\eta})\right]$
$|\widehat{\pi}_t| \geqq 0.02$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1-\theta)\left[i^* + \phi_\pi(\widehat{\pi}_t - \widetilde{\pi})\right]$	$i_t = \theta i_{t-1} + (1-\theta)\left[\begin{array}{c} i^* + \phi_\pi(\widehat{\pi}_t - \widetilde{\pi}) \\ + \phi_\eta(\widehat{\eta}_t - \widetilde{\eta}) \end{array}\right]$

In this setup the central banks shows a strong anti-inflation or anti-deflation bias, in both the CPI and in the share price index. In other words, the central bank worries a lot about absolute inflation being above targets, either in the CPI, or in Q, or both. But it worries little about inflation or deflation in either of these variables if the absolute value of the rate is below targets. There are thus four sets of outcomes: (1) if both inflation and asset-price growth are below the target levels, then the government follows a "do no harm" cautionary approach with $\phi_\pi = \phi_\eta = 0$; (2) if inflation is above the target rate, and asset-price inflation is below the target, the monetary authority puts strong weight on CPI inflation and sets $\phi_\eta = 0$; (3) if only asset-price growth is above its target, the central bank puts strong weight on the asset-price growth target and sets $\phi_\pi = 0$; (4) if both asset-price growth and inflation are above targets, it adopts a Taylor rule on both inflation and Q-growth.

Note that monetary policy in all instances operates symmetrically. The same weight applies to inflation or growth, with different signs, when they are above or below their targets. For simplicity, with no long run inflation nor trends in terms of trade, we set the targets for inflation and growth to be zero; $\widetilde{\pi} = \widetilde{\eta} = 0$.

Uncertainly about the underlying longer-term inflation in the CPI or asset price is a rationale for our approach. Swanson (2006), for example, poses the issue as a signal extraction problem for a policy-maker, with diffuse-middle priors. In our framework, policymakers are uncertain about the underlying rate of inflation or deflation in the range [-2, 2] percent, so they are unwilling to react within this interval. As observed inflation or deflation moves

further away from their prior values, they react once it hits the upper/lower bounds. The main feature of this type of behaviour is "policy attentuation for small surprises" followed by "increasingly aggressive responses" at the margin [Swanson (2006): p.7].

3   Calibration and Solution Algorithm

In this section we discuss the calibration of parameters, initial conditions, and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables of the model. We then summarize the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) used for solving the model.

3.1   Parameters and Initial Conditions

The parameter settings for the model appear in Table 3.

Table 3: Calibrated Parameters		
Consumption	$\gamma = 3.0$,	$\beta = 0.009$
	$\alpha_x = 0.5,$	$\alpha_f = 0.5$
Production	$\theta_m = 0.7,$	$\theta_x = 0.3$
	$\delta_x = \delta_m = 0.025$	
	$\phi_x = \phi_m = 0.03$	

Many of the parameter selections follow Mendoza (1995). The constant relative risk aversion γ is set at 3.0 (to allow for high interest sensitivity). The share of non-traded goods in overall consumption is set at 0.5, while the share of exports and imports in traded goods consumption is 50 percent each. Production in the export goods sector is more capital intensive than in the import goods sector.

The initial values of the nominal exchange rate, the price of non-tradeables and the price of importable and exportable goods are normalized at unity while the initial values for the stock of capital and financial assets (domestic and foreign debt) are selected so that they are compatible with the implied

steady state value of consumption, $\overline{C} = 2.02$, which is given by the interest rate and the endogenous discount factor. The values of $\overline{C}^x$, $\overline{C}^m$, and $\overline{C}^n$ were calculated on the basis of the preference parameters in the sub-utility functions and the initial values of B and L^* deduced. The steady-state level of investment for each sector is equal to the depreciation rate multiplied by the respective steady-state capital stock.

Similarly, the initial shadow price of capital for each sector is set at its steady state value. The production function coefficients A^m and A^x, along with the initial values of capital for each sector, are chosen to ensure that the marginal product of capital in each sector is equal to the real interest plus depreciation, while the level of production meets demand in each sector. Since the focus of the study is on the effects of terms of trade shocks, the domestic productivity coefficients were fixed for all the simulations.

Finally, the foreign interest rate i^* is also fixed at the annual rate of 0.04. In the simulations, the effect of initialization is mitigated by discarding the first 100 simulated values.

3.2   Solution Algorithm and Constraints

Following Marcet (1988, 1993), Den Haan and Marcet (1990, 1994), and Duffy and McNelis (2001), we parameterize nonlinear decision rules for $C_{t,t}$ S_t, I_t^x, I_t^x, given by $\psi^S, \psi^C, \psi^{I^x}$, and ψ^{I^f}:

$$C_t = \psi^C(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}; \Omega_C) \tag{46}$$

$$S_t = \psi^S(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}; \Omega_S) \tag{47}$$

$$I_t^x = \psi^{I^x}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}; \Omega_{Q^x}) \tag{48}$$

$$I_t^m = \psi^{I^m}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}; \Omega_{Q^m}) \tag{49}$$

The parameters of these decision rules are selected to minimize the squared Euler-equation errors given in (**??**) to (29):

The symbol $\mathbf{x}_{t-1}$ represents a vector of observable state variables known at time t: the terms of trade, the capital stock for exports and manufacturing goods, the level of foreign debt and the interest rate, relative to their steady

18

state values:

$$\mathbf{x}_t = \ln \left[\frac{P_t^{x*}}{P_t^{m*}}, \frac{K_{t-1}^x}{\overline{K}^x}, \frac{K_{t-1}^m}{\overline{K}^m}, \frac{L_{t-1}^*}{\overline{L}^*}, \frac{1+i_{t-1}}{1+\overline{i}} \right] \qquad (50)$$

The symbols $\Omega_\lambda, \Omega_S, \Omega_{Q^x}$, and Ω_{Q^m} represent the parameters for the expectation function, while $\psi^C, \psi^E, \psi^{Q^x}$ and ψ^{Q^f} are the expectation approximation functions.[8]

Judd (1996) classifies this approach as a "projection" or a "weighted residual" method for solving functional equations, and notes that the approach was originally developed by Williams and Wright (1982, 1984). The functional forms for $\psi^E, \psi^C, \psi^{Q^x}$, and ψ^{Q^f} are usually second-order polynomial expansions [see, for example, Den Haan and Marcet (1994)]. However, Duffy and McNelis (2001) have shown that neural networks can produce results with greater accuracy for the same number of parameters, or equal accuracy with fewer parameters, than the second-order polynomial approximation.

We use a neural network specification with two neurons for each of the decision variables. The neurons take on values between [0, 1] for a logsigmoid function and between [-1, 1] for a tansigmoid function The functions were then weighted by coefficients, and an exponent or anti-log function applied to the final value. The functions were multiplied by the steady state values to ensure steady state convergence.

The model was simulated for repeated parameter values for $\{\Omega_C, \Omega_S, \Omega_{Q^x}, \Omega_{Q^m}\}$ and convergence obtained when the expectation errors were minimized. In the algorithm, the following non-negativity constraints for consumption and the stocks of capital were imposed by the functional forms of the approximating functions:

$$C_t^x > 0, \quad K_t^x > 0, \quad K_t^m > 0, \quad I_t^x > 0, \quad I_t^m > 0, \quad i_t > 0 \qquad (51)$$

The usual no-Ponzi game applies to the evolution of real government debt and foreign assets, namely:

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} B_t \exp^{-it} = 0, \qquad \lim_{t\to\infty} L_t^* \exp^{-(i^*+\Delta s_{t+1})t} = 0 \qquad (52)$$

---

[8]In the case of no learning and optimal Taylor rules, the coefficients in the Taylor rules are jointly estimated with the parameters of the expectation functions.

Figure 1: One realization of the terms of trade shocks

We keep the foreign asset or foreign debt to GDP ratio bounded, and thus fulfill the transversality condition, by imposing the following constraint on the parameterized expectations algorithm:[9]

$$\sum \left(\frac{|S_t L_t^*| / P_t}{y_t} \right) < \widetilde{L}, \qquad \sum \left(\frac{|B_t| / P_t}{y_t} \right) < \widetilde{B} \qquad (53)$$

where $\widetilde{L}$, and $\widetilde{B}$ are the critical foreign and domestic debt ratios.

4   Simulation Analysis

4.1   Base-Line Results

The aim of the simulations is to compare the outcome for consumption, inflation and welfare for the two policy scenarios - inflation targeting (π) and inflation and Q-growth targeting (π and η). To ensure that the results are robust, we conducted 1000 simulations (each containing a time-series of 250 realizations of terms of trade shocks) for the case of relatively low pass-through ($\omega = .3$).

---

[9]In the PEA algorithm, the error function will be penalized if the foreign debt/gdp ratio is violated. Thus, the coefficients for the optimal decision rules will yield debt/gdp ratios which are well below levels at which the constaint becomes binding.

Figure 1 shows the simulated paths for one time series realization of the exogenous terms of trade index. Figure 2 pictures the paths of consumption and inflation, with no-learning, where the solid lines are for the case of pure inflation targets, while the dashed lines are for the case of inflation and Q-growth targeting. Figure 3 shows the same variables under a learning environment. The simulated values for other variables (not shown) are also well-behaved.

In the learning scenarios, we note that, despite the large swings in the terms of trade index, consumption is more stable with the inclusion of Q-growth targeting under both Taylor frameworks. We also see that both inflation and Q-growth do fall outside the bounds of [-0.02 0.02] for the state-contingent framework. However, the violations of these bounds are not persistent, neither in the case of pure CPI nor in the case of CPI and asset-price inflation targets.

To ascertain which policy regime yields the higher welfare value, we examined the distribution of the welfare outcomes of the different policy regimes for 1000 different realizations of the terms of trade shocks. Before presenting these results, we present the accuracy checks of the simulation results as well as the "rationality" of the learning mechanism.

4.2 Accuracy Test

The accuracy of the simulations may be checked by the Judd-Gaspar (1996) statistic which is the maximum value of the absolute value of the Euler equation error for consumption ν_t relative to C_t. That is, for realization j, with size T, the accuracy measure is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
JG_{\max}^{(j)} &= \max\left[\frac{\mid \nu_t \mid}{C_t}\right] \\
\text{where} \quad \nu_t &= \vartheta_{t+1}\Lambda_{t+1}\frac{1}{P_{t+1}}(1+i_t) - \vartheta_t\Lambda_t\frac{1}{P_t}
\end{aligned}
$$

This statistic is a measure of the maximum error relative to a dollar spent on consumption for each realization.

Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the Judd-Gaspar

Figure 2: Time Series with Fixed and Optimal Taylor Coefficients with No Learning: inflation targeting (solid line), inflation/Q-growth targeting (dashed line)

22

Figure 3: Time Series under Standard and State-Contingent Taylor Rules with Learning: inflation targeting (solid line), inflation/Q-growth targeting (dashed line)

accuracy measures based on the maximum absolute error measures. We see that the average size of the accuracy error measures are in the range 0.16 to 0.32 of one cent for every dollar spent on consumption.

Table 4: Judd-Gaspar Accuracy Statistic: Maximum Absolute Error Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis)	
Taylor Rule with Fixed Coefficients and No Learning	
Inflation Targeting: $O(\pi)$	0.0016 (0.0003)
Inflation/Q-Growth Targeting: $O(\pi, \eta)$	0.0023 (0.0004)
Taylor Rule with Optimal Coefficients and No Learning	
Inflation Targeting: $N(\pi)$	0.0016 (0.0003)
Inflation/Q-Growth Targeting: $N(\pi, \eta)$	0.0018 (0.0003)
Taylor Rule Framework with Learning	
Inflation Targeting: $T(\pi)$	0.0024 (0.0004)
Inflation/Q-Growth Targeting: $T(\pi, \eta)$	0.0016 (0.0004)
State Contingent Taylor Rule with Learning	
Inflation Targeting: $S(\pi)$	0.0017 (0.0003)
Inflation/Q-Growth Targeting: $S(\pi, \eta)$	0.0032 (0.0006)

4.3   Learning and Quasi-Rationality

In our model, the central bank learns the underlying process for inflation in the pure inflation-target regime and the underlying processes for inflation and growth in the inflation-Q-growth targeting regime. Learning takes the form of recursive updating of the least-squares estimates of a vector autoregressive model.

Marcet and Nicolini (2003) raise the issue of reasonable rationality requirements in their discussion of recurrent hyperinflation and learning behavior. In our model, a similar issue arises. Given that the only shocks in the model are recurring terms of trade shocks, with no abrupt, unexpected

structural changes taking place, the learning behavior of the central bank should not depart, for too long, from the rational expectations paths. The central bank, after a certain period of time, should develop forecasts which converge to the true inflation and growth paths of the economy, unless we wish to make some special assumption about monetary authority behavior.

Marcet and Nicolini discuss the concepts of "asymptotic rationality", "epsilon-delta rationality" and "internal consistency", as criteria for "boundedly rational" solutions. They draw attention to the work of Bray and Savin (1986). These authors examine whether the learning model rejects serially uncorrelated prediction errors between the learning model and the rational expectations solution, with the use of the Durbin-Watson statistic. Following Bray and Savin, we also use the Durbin-Watson statistic to examine whether the learning behavior is "boundedly rational".

Table 5 presents the Durbin-Watson statistics for the inflation and Q-growth forecast errors of the central bank, under both policy regimes. In both cases, the learning behavior is boundedly rational in the sense that the Central bank does not make persistent forecast errors. Nevertheless, the presence of forecast errors imply that Taylor rules under learning would be different from Taylor rules without learning.

Table 5: Durbin-Watson Statistics for Forecast Errors Percentage in Lower and Upper Critical Regions		
	Inflation	Q-Growth
Standard Tayor Rule		
Inflation Targeting: $T(\widehat{\pi})$	0/0	—
Inflation/ Q-Growth Targeting: $T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	0/0	0/0
State-Contingent Taylor Rules		
Inflation Targeting: $S(\widehat{\pi})$	0/0	—
Inflation/ Q-Growth Targeting: $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	0/0	0/0

4.4   Comparative Results

This section summarizes the results for 1000 alternate realizations of the terms-of-trade shocks (each realization contains 250 observations), for the Taylor rule and the State-Contingent Taylor rules for conducting monetary policy with central bank learning. Table 6 presents the mean and standard deviation of the coefficients of variations of the 1000 samples for consumption, inflation and Q-exports.

The simulation results across policy frameworks (with pre-set Taylor rule coefficients) show a fall in the coefficient of variation for consumption, when we change from an inflation only to an inflation/Q-growth regime. As for the target variables, the coefficient of variations for inflation and Q-growth fell under standard Taylor rules, but they increased under the state-contingent scheme.

Table 6: Summary Statistics of the Coefficient of Variation Mean (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)		
	$T(\widehat{\pi})$	$T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$
Consumption	0.0119 (0.0016)	0.0098 (0.0022)
Inflation	0.0138 (0.0013)	0.0071 (0.0011)
Q-growth	0.0251 (0.0025)	0.0155 (0.0029)
	$S(\widehat{\pi})$	$S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$
Consumption	0.0199 (0.0033)	0.0150 (0.0021)
Inflation	0.0223 (0.0026)	0.0254 (0.0022)
Q-growth	0.0343 (0.0039)	0.0347 (0.0030)

4.5   Welfare Implications

Figure 4 shows the welfare differences for different comparisons of the 4 possible regimes, with learning, considered in the paper. These distributions show

that $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$ unambiguously generates better welfare outcomes compared to $S(\widehat{\pi})$ and $T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$, and, on average for the majority of times, generates better welfare outcomes than the simpliest framework $T(\widehat{\pi})$.

Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we also computed the average consumption compensation necessary for a household to be as well off in the reference regime compared to the alternative. Using the relationship below

$$U((1 - \lambda)C_t^r) = U(C_t^a)$$

and the utility function and the welfare functions in (1) and (2) respectively yields:

$$\lambda\% = \left[1 - \left(\frac{W^a}{W^r} \right)^{\frac{1}{(1-\gamma)}} \right] \times 100$$

Positive values indicate what households can give up to be as well off in the alternative regime compared to the reference regime. Negative values indicate the consumption compensation necessary for households to be as well off. As shown in Table 7, a household has to give up 0.1295% of the consumption in a regime with standard Taylor rules and inflation-only targeting $T(\widehat{\pi})$ to be as well off in a policy framework with standard Taylor rules with inflation and Q-growth targeting $T(\widehat{\widehat{\pi}}, \widehat{\eta})$. In other words, $T(\widehat{\widehat{\pi}}, \widehat{\eta})$ is, on average, welfare-reducing. In contrast, a household would need to be compensated by 0.2409% of the consumption in a $T(\widehat{\pi})$ policy regime to be as well off in a policy framework with state-contingent Taylor rules with inflation targeting $S(\widehat{\pi})$. In other words, the state-contingent Taylor rule $S(\widehat{\pi})$, on average, is welfare-improving, relative to the linear Taylor rule. Overall, these results show that a household can be better off, in a learning regime, with state-contingent Taylor rules. The best improvements come from switching from a pure inflation targeting regime with either simple or state-contingent Taylor rules ($T(\widehat{\pi})$ or $S(\widehat{\pi})$) to the state-contingent Taylor rule aimed at both inflation and Q-growth $S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$. The consumption gain is 0.59 and 0.72 per cent respectively.

In contrast, in a no learning environment, changing from a pure Taylor rule with inflation targets to an optimal rule with asset-price inflation targets

Figure 4: Welfare Differences Under Rules with Learning

yields negligible welfare differences. The consumption compensation with $N(\pi)$ as the reference and $N(\pi, \eta)$ as the alternative is only 0.0781%. In other words, under perfect model certainty, including asset-price inflation targets makes little or no difference to welfare - significant welfare differences only emerge in the learning context and for state-contingent Taylor rules.

Table 7: Consumption Compensation (%)		
Policy Frameworks		
reference	alternative	
$T(\widehat{\pi})$	$T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	0.1295
$T(\widehat{\pi})$	$S(\widehat{\pi})$	-0.2409
$T(\widehat{\pi})$	$S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	-0.5900
$T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	$S(\widehat{\pi})$	-0.3714
$T(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	$S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	-0.3477
$S(\widehat{\pi})$	$S(\widehat{\pi}, \widehat{\eta})$	-0.7203

5 Concluding Remarks

This paper examined the effect of incorporating the rate of growth of Tobin's Q as an additional target to inflation for monetary policy in a learning environment. Our simulation results show that, in a learning environment, adding Q-growth in a linear Taylor case is welfare-reducing, but adding Q-growth in the state contingent case is welfare-improving. The intuition is that there are errors associated with forecasts, and the addition of an extra target compounds the forecast errors (especially since, inflation and Q-growth are positively correlated). In the linear Taylor rule case, the interest rate is reacting continuously to information (measured with errors) whereas in the state-contingent case, the interest rate is only reacting to information about inflation and Q-growth when they are outside the upper and lower bounds.

In the learning environment with state-contingent Taylor rule, adding information about asset-price inflation helps because it improves the central bank's ability to forecast inflation. When the central bank does not know

the true model, including asset-price growth brings into the policy process forward-looking information which then improves the effectiveness of monetary policy. Under no learning, or perfect model certainty, the introduction of a Q-growth target in addition to CPI inflation is, on average welfare-reducing, albeit negligible.

In this paper, we have assumed that the driving force for Q growth comes from fundamentals, both in the underlying model and in the learning process. Given that the Central bank has to learn the laws of motion of Q-growth as well as inflation, and set policy on the basis of longer-term laws of motion of these variables, it seems reasonable to start with Q driven solely by fundamentals. We leave to further research an examination of the robustness of our results to the incorporation of bubbles and other non-fundamental asset-price shocks.[10]

Finally, we note that our time-varying state-contingent interest-rate rules, coming from uncertainty about the true laws of motion of consumer and asset-price inflation dynamics, generated by a nonlinear stochastic model, is a step away from the design of a nonlinear interest-rate rule, in which the laws of motion are approximated by nonlinear approximation methods. It may be that nonlinear policy rules may show even more beneficial effects from a cautionary monetary policy aimed at asset price as well as consumer price inflation.

---

[10]See Dupor (2005) for a closed economy study of whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations which are not driven by fundamentals.

References

[1] Brainard, W.C. and Tobin, J., 1977. Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital, Chapter 11, in: Balassa,B. and Nelson,R.R. (eds.) "Economic Progress, Private Values and Public Policy", North-Holland, pp.235-262.

[2] Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M., 1999. Monetary Policy and Asset Volatility, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, 844. 17-52.

[3] Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M., 2001. Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices? American Economic Review, 91., 253-257.

[4] Brainard, W., 1967. Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy, American Economic Review 57, 411-425.

[5] Bray, M.M. and N.E. Savin, 1986. Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification, Econometrica, 54, 1129-1160.

[6] Bullard, J. and Mitra, K., 2002. Learning About Monetary Policy Rules, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 1105-1129.

[7] Campa, J.M and Goldberg L.S., 2002. Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices: A Macro or Micro Phenomenon?. NBER Working Paper 8934.

[8] Cecchetti, S.G., Genberg, H. and Wadhwani, S., 2002. Asset Prices in a Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework, paper presented at the FRB Chicago conference.

[9] Den Haan. W. and Marcet, A., 1990., Solving the Stochastic Growth Model by Parameterizing Expectations, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 8, 31-34.

[10] Den Haan. W. and Marcet, A. 1994., Accuracy in Simulations, Review of Economic Studies 61, 3-17.

[11] Detken, C. and Smets, F. 2004., Asset Price Booms and Monetary Policy, in Horst Siebert (Ed.), Macroeconomic Policies in the World Economy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 190-227.

[12] Duffy, J. and McNelis, P.D., 2001., Approximating and Simulating the Stochastic Growth Model: Parameterized Expectations, Neural Networks and the Genetic Algorithm, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 1273-1303.

[13] Dupor, B., 2005. Stabilizing Non-Fundamental Asset Price Movements under Discretion and Limited Information, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.

[14] Evans, G.W. and Honkapohja, S., 2003. Adaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Design, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 1046-1072.

[15] Gilchrist, S. and Leahy, J.V., 2002., Monetary Policy and Asset Prices, Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 75-97.

[16] Gruen, D., Plumb, M. and Stone, A., 2005. How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles, International Journal of Central Banking 1, 1-31.

[17] Honkapohja, S. and Mitra, K.,2005. Performance of Monetary Policy with Internal Central Bank Forecasting, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29, 627-658.

[18] Judd, K.L., 1996. Approximation, Perturbation, and Projection Methods in Economic Analysis"in H.M. Amman, D.A. Kendrick and J. Rust (Eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. I. Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.

[19] Judd, K.L. and Gaspar, J., 1996. Solving Large Scale Rational Expectations Models, Macroeconomic Dynamics 1, 45-75.

[20] Marcet, A., 1988. Solving Nonlinear Models by Parameterizing Expectations.. Working Paper, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University.

[21] Marcet, A., 1993. Simulation Analysis of Dynamic Stochastic Models: Applications to Theory and Estimation, Working Paper, Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

[22] Marcet, A. and Nicolini, J.P., 2003. Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning, American Economic Review, 93., 1476-1498.

[23] Mendoza, E.G., 1995. The Terms of Trade, the Real Exchange Rate, and Economic Fluctuations, International Economic Review 36, 101-137.

[24] Rustem, B., Wieland, V. Žaković, S., 2005. Stochastic Optimization and Worst-Case Analysis in Monetary Policy Design, web page: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5019.asp.

[25] Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M. 2003. Closing Small Open Economy Models, Journal of International Economics 61, 163-185.

[26] Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M., 2004. Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules, NBER Working Paper 10253.

[27] Smets, Frank, 1997., Financial Asset Prices and Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidencein P. Lowe (Ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting. Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney.

[28] Summers, L., 2003. Address on the Bubble in Asset Prices, Davos World Economic Forum, Annual Meeting 2003, Web page: www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/_S7593?open.

[29] Swanson, E.T., 2006. Optimal Nonlinear Policy: Signal Extraction with a Non-Normal Prior, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 185-203.

[30] Taylor, J.B., 1993. Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochaster Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214.

[31] Taylor, J.B., 1999. The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines for Interest Rate Setting by the European Central Bank, Journal of Monetary Economics 43, 655-679.

[32] Tobin, J. ,1969. A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1, 15-29.

[33] Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C., 1982. The Economic Role of Commodity Storage, Economic Journal 92, 596-614.

[34] Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C.,.1984. The Welfare Effects of the Introduction of Storage, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 169-182.

[35] Uzawa, H., 1968. Time Preference, The Consumption Function, and Optimum Asset Holdings in J. N. Wolfe (Ed.), Value, Capital and Growth: Papers in Honor of Sir John Hicks. University of Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh.